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Abstract 
There are three major objectives of this paper: first, to examine the various exchange rate 
regimes and arrangements that have emerged over the last 40 years since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of each, 
particularly as they relate to inflation and real economic growth, second, to analyze the 
historical relationship between the Kingdom’s various exchange rate regimes and the 
performance of its non-oil private sector, and third, to compare Saudi Arabia’s economic 
performance since 1986 (when the riyal was firmly pegged to the US dollar) with a number 
of other developed and developing countries that have followed different exchange rate 
arrangements. The findings of this paper confirm that the dollar peg has served Saudi Arabia 
well. 
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Since the beginning of the modern era in 1973, Saudi Arabia’s monetary and exchange rate 
policy has been dominated, over most of the period, by a de-facto Saudi riyal peg to either the 
SDR or the US dollar. Prior to mid-1981, the riyal was loosely pegged (plus or minus 7.5 
percent) with the IMF’s SDR basket of currencies, but, since 1986, it has been tightly pegged 
with the US dollar, at SAR 3.75 per dollar. 
Coincidentally, the beginning of the modern era in Saudi Arabia coincided with a watershed 
event in world economic history—the collapse of the post-World War II Bretton Woods 
Agreement, which pegged the value of most of the world’s currencies to the dollar at a fixed 
rate.After the collapse, the currencies of most of the major industrialized nations of Europe 
(e.g., the pound, Deutsche mark, French and Swiss francs), along with the Japanese yen and 
Australian dollar, began floating independently, with most of them appreciating against the 
dollar, in order to correct the chronic undervaluation that had developed in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
In contrast, the immediate response of the developing countries was more varied.Many 
countries chose to continue their dollar peg, particularly in Central and South America.Others 
chose to peg their currencies to those of their former colonial rulers—e.g., the former French 
colonies of Africa. Others, including Saudi Arabia, chose to peg their currencies to a basket of 
currencies—in the case of Saudi Arabia, to the IMF’s SDR (Note 1). Some of these pegs were 
“firm”, in that their value was maintained within a very narrow band.Others were “soft”; for 
instance, the Saudi riyal’s value was initially allowed to vary by plus or minus 7.5 percent 
from the SDR.  
Over time, the various country exchange rate regimes and arrangements have shifted and 
changed—for instance, the Kingdom abandoned its SDR peg in mid-1981, floated lower 
against the dollar between 1982 and mid-1986, and then was pegged tightly with the US 
dollar in mid-1986, at a value that has not changed for almost three decades (Note 2). Perhaps 
the most noteworthy development has been the plethora of different combinations of regimes 
and arrangements, ranging from freely floating currencies with a minimum of intervention to 
currency unions, where an individual country completely abandons its ability to print money 
and practice any semblance of an independent monetary policy, even the most minimal 
degree of liquidity control. 
This paper is divided into three parts. It will first examine the various exchange rate regimes 
and arrangements that have emerged over the last 40 years since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, classify and categorize them, and analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of each (Note 3). The second part of the paper will analyze the historical 
relationship between the different exchange rate regimes that have been practiced by the 
Kingdom and the corresponding economic performance of its non-oil private sector, as 
measured by its real GDP growth and inflation. It will look at what the economic literature 
has to say about emerging and developing countries in general, in relation to the impact of 
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their exchange rate regimes on their economic performance. 
The third and final part of the paper will compare the Kingdom’s economic performance 
during 1986-2014, the period over which the Saudi riyal was firmly pegged to the dollar, with 
a number of other developed and developing economies that have followed different 
exchange rate arrangements. This section is not intended to be a detailed econometric 
analysis of the empirical evidence; rather, it will draw some obvious conclusions from a 
simple comparison of compound annual growth rates for real GDP and inflation among the 
various countries in the analysis (Note 4). 
1.2 Exchange Rate Regimes and Arrangements: Classification and Analysis of Advantages 
and Disadvantages 
1.2.1 Firm Peg Exchange Rate Regimes and Arrangements 
Perhaps the most inflexible exchange rate regime is that of “dollarization” (Note 5). Actually, 
the US dollar does not have to be used; any “foreign” currency can serve. The other country’s 
currency is circulated, and all bank balances are in the other currency. 
The advantages of this regime include: 1) takes on the credibility of the adopted currency, 2) 
facilitates disinflation and reduces currency crises, and 3) has lower transaction costs and 
more stable interest rates. Disadvantages are: 1) complete lack of monetary autonomy, 2) 
central bank is no longer lender of last resort, 3) no seigniorage, 4) no ability to absorb either 
real or nominal shocks, and 5) difficulty in exiting, since no local alternative exists. 
A currency union is the next most inflexible exchange rate regime, in that no individual 
country in the union has control over its currency or monetary policy. However, the 
individual countries in the union do have a voice and representation in the currency union’s 
central bank. The European Monetary Union (EMU, or euro zone) is the most obvious 
example of a currency union, but the euro itself is classified as an independent float (World 
Bank designation), or a free floating (IMF designation) currency. 
The advantages of a currency union are similar to dollarization, while the disadvantages are 
mitigated somewhat, as follows: 1) some autonomy is gained through representation in the 
board of the central bank, 2) the central bank can act as a lender of last resort, but is not as 
politically responsive, 3) seigniorage is shared with other members of the union, and 4) 
systemic union-wide shocks are absorbed, but local shocks are not. 
Under the “currency board” system, the country’s legislature has to explicitly commit to this 
system with the foreign numeraire currency guaranteed to be exchanged at a fixed rate to the 
local currency. Domestic currency is issued only against foreign exchange at the fixed rate. 
The advantages of a currency board are similar to dollarization, as are the disadvantages, with 
the following exceptions: 1) some seigniorage is possible, and 2) exiting from a currency 
board is easier. 
In the fixed (conventional) peg regime, the exchange rate is pegged to a major currency or 
basket of currencies (such as the SDR). However, the country’s central bank is not statutorily 
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committed to maintain the peg at that rate forever, and the peg can be adjusted either up or 
down when misalignment becomes a problem. The central bank can defend the peg, either 
through direct intervention in the spot and forward markets, or indirectly, through monetary 
policy and domestic interest rates. Most central bank functions are possible, but are limited, 
given free capital movements. 
Advantages of a fixed peg regime include: 1) stability, given that the peg is credible, 2) lower 
interest rates, 3) provision of a clear and easy-to-understand nominal anchor, and 4) 
moderation of inflationary expectations for high inflation countries. Disadvantages are: 1) 
susceptibility to currency crises, if capital markets are open to international flows, 2) 
requirement of a high level of international reserves, and 3) low ability to absorb shocks, 
which are instead passed on to the real sector of the economy. 
Both the IMF and the World Bank place a fixed peg regime in the “soft peg” category below, 
on the grounds that there is no de jure (legal) guarantee of the peg’s permanence. In the 
authors’ opinion, the proper standard is a de facto (empirical) peg that has remained very 
stable over a large number of years. In order to qualify as a fixed peg in the IMF/WB 
definition, a currency must not vary around its statutory pegged value by more than plus or 
minus one percent for at least six months (Note 6). Compare this to the Saudi riyal, which has 
not varied by more than 0.13 percent over the past 30 years. It seems obvious that such a 
stable relationship should qualify the riyal as having a “hard” peg. For this reason, we have 
placed the conventional fixed peg in the Hard Peg category (Note 7).  
1.2.2 Soft Peg Exchange Rate Regimes and Arrangements 
Under the pegged within-bands regime, the exchange rate is allowed to vary within a narrow 
band around the peg, which can be either a single currency or a basket such as the SDR (Note 
8). Saudi Arabia adopted this regime in the 1973-1981 period. Advantages of the regime 
include 1) somewhat more flexibility in monetary policy, and 2) a somewhat greater ability to 
absorb shocks. Disadvantages include the possibility that speculators can “game” the system 
by increasing their activity as the currency’s value approaches either of the limits, knowing 
that a change in the central value is increasingly likely. 
In the crawling peg arrangement, the exchange rate is periodically adjusted at a fixed 
preannounced rate to keep the effective (trade-adjusted average) exchange rate competitive. 
Since inflation differentials are often used, the net effect of this adjustment is to keep the real 
effective exchange rate from rising. The indicators used are usually forward-looking (e.g., 
inflationary expectations). The main disadvantage of this system is the increased likelihood 
that speculators can “game” the regime by estimating future inflation trends. It is also 
difficult to understand and explain to policy-makers. 
The crawling band regime is considered a hybrid regime which combines the previous two 
arrangements (Pegged within Bands and Crawling Peg), with the peg adjusted at a 
preannounced rate within a preannounced band. It has the same set of advantages and 
disadvantages, with the addition of a more complex operating procedure that is even more 
difficult to explain. It is somewhat reminiscent of the approach taken by the European Union 
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in the years preceding the institution of the EMU in late 1999. The European Currency Unit, 
or ECU, was composed of the weighted average values of the individual member currencies. 
It became the central reference value for the peg, and each of the participating members’ 
currencies were only allowed to deviate from this central value by a certain percentage. The 
strongest currencies would continually press against the upper limit of the band, while the 
weakest were always hovering at the lower limit. 
1.2.3 Floating Regimes and Arrangements 
In the managed float arrangement, the central bank actively intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market on a frequent basis (Note 9). The intervention may be direct, in both spot 
and forward markets, or indirect, through policy interest rates and even long-term market 
rates. Rules, such as those used with crawling bands, can be used, but they are usually 
unannounced. The major advantages of this regime are: 1) monetary policy is relatively free 
to be used in an effective manner to buffer external shocks and support fiscal policy, 2) it is 
harder for speculators to “game” the system, 3) there is a lower vulnerability to currency 
crises, and 4) stability and competitiveness can be maintained, if the regime is credible. The 
major disadvantages are: 1) the lack of transparency, since the criteria for intervention are not 
disclosed, and 2) a requirement for relatively high international reserves. 
It is worth mentioning that there is a major difference between the Managed Float explained 
above and the “lightly” managed float regarding the frequency of intervention. In the lightly 
managed regime, the exchange rate is mostly determined by market-based supply and 
demand fundamentals. On occasion, interventions of the same sort used in a managed float 
are performed, in order to moderate excessive exchange rate fluctuations. As a result, 
monetary policy is relatively unfettered and is mostly free to be used for domestic economic 
policy. The major advantages of this regime are: 1) its ability to deflect or absorb adverse 
external shocks, 2) its resistance to currency crisis and speculative excesses, and 3) the fact 
that high international reserves are not needed. Its disadvantages include 1) increased 
short-term exchange rate volatility, although excessive fluctuations may be dampened by 
selective intervention, 2) a tendency for large medium-term swings that are only weakly 
related to economic fundamentals, resulting in periods of currency misalignment, and 3) the 
temptation for monetary policy excesses that may create an inflationary bias. 
In the independent (free) float regime, exchange rates are determined by supply and demand 
operating freely in the foreign exchange market, without intervention by monetary authorities. 
Monetary policy is completely independent of the exchange rate regime and is free to be used 
as a tool in domestic economic management. The advantages of this regime are the same as a 
lightly managed float, as are the disadvantages, particularly in short-run volatility, due to a 
lack of intervention. 
1.3 The Evolution of Exchange Rate Policy in Saudi Arabia: Historical Perspectives  
1.3.1 Saudi Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Performance prior to 1986 
In US dollar terms, the 1973-1980 period saw an appreciation of the riyal, with the dollar 
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shocks. On the other hand, fixed exchange rates may offer less uncertainty about the future, 
which has a positive impact on investment and therefore growth. In both cases, exchange rate 
stability may lead to better outcomes. However, a stable exchange rate at the wrong level may 
pump up inflation beyond the desired level. With high inflation, exports become more 
expensive (although this does not apply to oil exports, as their price is set in the world 
market), and the cost of investment increases, which affects growth negatively. Therefore, 
historical data about GDP growth and inflation levels, together with their volatilities, can be 
used to assess whether the exchange rate is set properly or not. Good exchange rate regimes 
should contribute positively to stability and hence growth.  
Although it seems obvious that there is a positive association between the pegged exchange 
rate and economic performance in the case of Saudi Arabia, the economic literature on this 
relationship for emerging and developing countries in general has been mixed. There are 
theoretical arguments on both sides of the issue. Factors favoring flexible exchange rates 
include the possibility that they could cushion price distortions and the misallocation of 
resources (e.g., high unemployment) in the event of real shocks. On the side of pegged 
exchange rates is the argument that they can reduce relative price volatility, resulting in 
higher trade and investment and leading to lower real interest rates and faster growth. A 
credible fixed exchange rate regime can contribute to a predictable and disciplined monetary 
policy and can reduce the possibility of exchange rate speculation, leading to stronger 
economic growth (Note 14).  
The empirical evidence concerning this relationship in emerging and developing economies 
is mixed. One of the more comprehensive studies, by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2003), 
showed a strong and positive relationship between exchange rate flexibility, economic growth, 
and lack of volatility—i.e., more flexible exchange rate regimes were associated with faster 
and smoother-growing economies. It is interesting to note that this relationship only applied 
to the emerging and developing nations—there was no strong relationship in either direction 
for developed economies (Note 15). However, the study had a major weakness in that it did 
not consider a country’s natural resource base, particularly one that was denominated in US 
dollars, as a factor in the analysis. 
If we look at the arguments for a more flexible currency, it becomes apparent that most of 
them do not apply in the case of Saudi Arabia. The possibility of real shocks causing high real 
exchange rates is not particularly disturbing, since an overvalued riyal is not likely to harm 
the Kingdom’s exports, which are denominated in dollars. In addition, the Saudi economy is 
not particularly sensitive to high real interest rates that might accompany these shocks. 
Furthermore, a strong exchange rate would reduce the cost of imports, which would act to 
keep inflation low. 
SAMA’s policy credibility and the preservation of a substantial reserve of liquid foreign 
currency assets are the key to maintaining the riyal peg with the US dollar. This reserve not 
only provides liquidity for defending the riyal; it also sends a strong message to speculators. 
This, of course, requires strong financial reserves, primarily supplied by Saudi government 
deposits. As evidence of this importance, note that both of the speculative attacks on the riyal 
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in the 1990s came when government deposits dipped to extremely low levels—only SAR 
42.5 billion at the end of 1993 and 49.2 billion at the end of 1998 (Note 16). In sharp contrast, 
total government deposits at the end of 2015 amounted to SAR 1162.5 billion, more than 23 
times as much as in 1998 (Note 17). Moreover, the massive foreign reserves maintained at 
SAMA (SAR 2.3 trillion at the end of 2015) is indicative of the fundamental strength 
underlying the dollar peg, and the credibility of its monetary policy. 
Much has been made of the fact that these reserves are sufficient to last for several years at 
the current rate of depletion. Since some energy analysts are predicting that the depressed 
condition of oil prices could conceivably last for longer than this, there are concerns that 
these reserves could be exhausted, unless government spending is curbed and new sources of 
revenues are obtained. However, such an analysis ignores the tremendous borrowing capacity 
of the Saudi government, and its ability to borrow this money from both domestic and 
international sources (Note 18). A combination of targeted cuts in government spending 
(particularly on imported goods), combined with the issuance of government bonds to 
domestic borrowers (including citizens) and the spending from reserve accounts (particularly 
from those funds earmarked for specific capital projects) should enable the government to 
maintain a sufficient level of deposits with SAMA, which would in turn allow for a 
comfortable level of foreign reserves to be maintained. The Fiscal Balance Program rightly 
focus on eliminating the overall fiscal deficit by 2020while preserving macroeconomic 
stability and protecting the most vulnerable segments. 
2. Method 
To assess how the dollar peg has served the Saudi economy over the past three decades, we 
carry out a simple cross-country comparison analysis. In this section, a comparative analysis 
has been performed between Saudi Arabia and the GCC, as well as the G20 countries, using 
the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of real GDP and CPI over the period (1986-2014). 
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Table 1. Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of Real GDP and CPI or the GCC 
Countries: 1986-2014 
Country 
CAGR Standard Deviation (S.D.) 
GDP CPI S.D. of Real GDP Growth Rate S.D. of Inflation 
Saudi Arabia 4.0 1.4 3.6 2.5 
U.A.E. 5.3 3.9 7.2 3.0 
Kuwait 4.0 3.2 20.5 3.1 
Oman 3.9 2.1 3.0 3.3 
Qatar 7.8 3.7 9.0 4.3 
Bahrain 4.4 1.4 2.4 1.9 
Source: Authorities; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database.  
 
Turning now to the G-20 group of nations, Figure 5 shows the CAGR growth rates of real 
GDP for each of the member countries, plus the aggregate euro area growth. Note that, due to 
the lack of data, the growth rates for the euro area and Russia start from 1991 and 1992, 
respectively. Note that the Saudi growth of 4.0 percent places the Kingdom as the fifth 
fastest-growing member, growing about as fast as Turkey over the last 28 years.  
 
 
Figure 5. Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of Real GDP for the G-20 
Nations—1986-2014 
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Figure 6 shows the inflation rates for the G20 countries over the 1987-2014 period. Note that, 
due to the lack of data, the inflation rates for the Euro Area, Russia, and Argentina start from 
1991, 1992, and 1997 respectively. Brazil’s inflation rate of 113.1 percent has been omitted 
due to scaling issues. 
 
 
Figure 6. Inflation—Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of CPI for the G-20 
Nations—1986-2014 
 
Also note that Saudi Arabia had the second lowest inflation rate (as measured by the CAGR 
of the CPI) in the G-20, with Japan being the only country with a lower rate. Japan’s low rate 
reflects the country’s lingering issue with chronic deflation that has accompanied its multiple 
periods of very slow growth and multiple “mini-recessions.” 
In sharp contrast to the low inflation rates of Saudi Arabia and the major developed nations, 
the inflation rates for Mexico, Turkey, and Russia were in the double-digit range. Brazil’s 
average inflation over the 28 year period was 113.1 percent, a reflection of the hyperinflation 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, with inflation peaking at 2948 percent in 1990. Obviously, this 
has skewed the analysis somewhat. In fact, it should be noted that the current inflation rates 
for all of the high inflation countries in this analysis are considerably lower than their average 
CAGRs over the 28 year period. For example, Brazil’s 2014 inflation was 6.3 percent, 
Russia’s was 7.8 percent, Turkey’s was 8.9 percent, and Mexico’s was 4.0 percent. 
As can be seen from Figure 7, the standard deviation measurement of the variance in the 
inflation rate shows much the same pattern. 
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Figure 7. Standard Deviation of CPI Inflation for the G-20 Nations—1986-2014 
 
Due to the lack of data, the standard deviation calculations for the Euro Area, and Argentina 
use data beginning in 1991, 1992, and 1997 respectively. Brazil’s and Russia’s standard 
deviation measurements have been omitted due to scaling problems. Brazil’s standard 
deviation was 760 percentage points and Russia’s was 192 over the 28 year period, as 
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Table 2. Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of Real GDP and CPI for the G-20 Nations: 
1986-2014 
Country 
CAGR Standard Deviation (S.D.) 
GDP CPI S.D. of Real GDP Growth Rate S.D. of Inflation 
Saudi Arabia 4.0 1.4 3.6 2.5 
Germany 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.2 
Australia 3.2 3.3 1.3 2.3 
Canada 2.4 3.2 1.8 1.4 
France 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Argentina 3.0 4.8 5.7 6.7 
India 6.5 7.7 2.2 2.9 
China 9.7 7.5 2.6 6.6 
Japan 1.6 0.5 2.5 1.2 
UK 2.2 2.8 2.0 1.7 
Euro Area 1.4 2.0 1.8 0.8 
U.S.A. 2.6 2.8 1.7 1.1 
Indonesia 5.4 9.7 4.0 9.8 
Italy 1.0 3.2 2.0 1.7 
Korea 5.9 4.1 3.9 2.2 
South Africa 2.5 8.2 2.0 4.3 
Mexico 2.7 16.6 3.0 32.7 
Turkey 4.1 40.0 4.6 32.0 
Russia 1.8 45.0 6.3 192.2 
Brazil 2.6 113.1 2.6 760.2 
Source: Authorities; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Due to the lack of data, the 
GDP and CPI data for the Euro Area and Russia start from 1991 and 1992 respectively. The CPI data for 
Argentina starts from 1997. 
 
One interesting analytical statistic is the difference between real GDP growth and inflation. A 
positive difference is an indication of better economic performance. For Saudi Arabia, the 
CAGR of real GDP was 2.6 percentage points greater than the CAGR of CPI (Table 2). In 
other words, its economic growth was considerably higher than its inflation rate. This is an 
indication that the pegged exchange rate regime has prevented strong growth from leading to 
higher inflation. Three other countries in the G-20—China, Japan, and Korea—also showed 
positive differences; however, the Saudi differential was the largest.  
4. Discussion 
To assess whether the dollar pegged regime has served the Saudi economy well, this study 
uses cross-sectional analysis over homogenous countries (e.g., GCC) as well as the 
heterogeneous ones in the G-20 over the period from 1986 to 2014. The overall findings 
based on the standard deviation of inflation and real GDP growth across countries have 
confirmed that Saudi Arabia has more stable economic growth and inflation rates than those 
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countries with similar economic structures but with other exchange rate regimes. The 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of real GDP and CPI across countries has shown that 
Saudi Arabia was among a select group of countries with good and stable output growth and 
moderate inflation. In particular, Saudi Arabia’s growth at a CAGR of 4.0 percent over a 28 
year period is in the top quartile of G-20 members, so the dollar peg has served the Kingdom 
well. The conclusions drawn in this paper will be of interest to policy makers, particularly 
those interested in examining the impact of different exchange rate policies on inflation and 
economic activities. 
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Notes 
Note 1. See Al-Jasser & Banafe (2005) for more information. 
Note 2. Ibid., p. 270. 
Note 3. Most of the information in this first section of the paper has been gathered from 
publications of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the two major 
institutions that were formed to administer and implement the Bretton Woods Agreement. It 
should be noted that, even though the Agreement itself has collapsed, these two institutions 
have remained indispensable in guiding the world’s governments in their monetary and 
financial affairs.  
Note 4. Future research using more detailed econometric analysis could provide us with more 
insight into the cause and effect relationship between exchange rate regime and economic 
performance in the Kingdom’s case. However, the relationship seems obvious, based on both 
intertemporal and cross-sectional comparisons using only the simple metrics of CAGR and its 
volatility. In such cases, a variant of Occam’s razor law may apply—the analytical scheme 
with the fewest assumptions (i.e., the simplest) should be selected. We would observe that 
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none of the many empirical analyses which we studied took into account the special case of 
oil-rich less developed countries. Such research remains to be done. 
Note 5. Ibid. (World Bank, p. 6). The IMF refers to this category as “No separate legal tender” 
(p. 6). The US dollar is the circulating currency for eight countries, while the euro is used in 
three countries, and the Australian dollar in two. The Currency Union and Currency Board 
explanations that follow are also taken from the World Bank article, p. 6. 
Note 6. Ibid., IMF, p. 69. 
Note 7. A better approach would be for the IMF and World Bank to set up two conventional 
peg categories, based on de facto standards for both longevity and deviation from the pegged 
level.Countries like Saudi Arabia, with a long history of maintaining the pegged level with 
little or no deviations would fall into the hard conventional peg category, while countries with 
less success in maintaining the pegged level would be placed into the soft conventional peg. 
Note 8. Ibid. (World Bank), p. 5. 
Note 9. Ibid. (World Bank), p. 4. 
Note 10. It should be noted that, prior to 1973, the riyal had strengthened considerably. See 
Al-Jasser & Banafe (2005) for more information.  
Note 11. Source: SAMA Annual Report Database, Table 8-1a. 
Note 12. The timing of these periods of pressure was probably no accident, since the pressure 
originated from speculators who were waiting for the end-of-year budget statement, which 
included the results of the year just ending and the budget for the next fiscal year. 
Note 13. See Al-Jasser & Banafe (2005), p. 267. 
Note 14. Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2003). 
Note 15. Ibid. 
Note 16. Source: SAMA Annual Report Database, Table 8b—Monetary Survey—Liabilities. 
Note 17. Source: SAMA Monthly Bulletin Database, Table 7b—Monetary 
Survey—Liabilities. 
Note 18. Foreign borrowing has been very limited in the past, but the Kingdom’s economic 
fundamentals (stable inflation environment, low debt levels, ample reserves, demographic 
advantages, and credible/supportive monetary policies) make this alternative possible. 
Note 19. As an illustration of this point, Saudi production of crude oil set an all-time record 
back in 1980, at 9.9 million barrels/day (mbd). This level of production was not surpassed 
until 2015, when 10.2 mbd were produced. This means that over 30% of the Saudi real GDP 
(which is stated in 2010 prices) showed almost no growth over the period. See Alkhareif, 
Barnett, & Alsadoun (2017) for more details. 
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